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INTRODUCTION

On November 25, 1976, the United States, concerned about the
welfare of its nationals incarcerated abroad, consumated a bilateral
treaty with Mexico providing for the transfer of penal sentences.1
The treaty was a response to allegedly unbearable prison conditions
in Mexico.2 Subsequent to the ratification of the Mexican Treaty, the
United States entered into treaties with Canada3 , Bolivia 4 , Panama5 ,
Turkey6 , Peru 7, Council of Europe8 and France., Although not yet in
1. Treaty on the Execution of Penal Sentences, Nov. 25, 1976, United States-Mexico, 28
U.S.T. 7399, T.I.A.S. No. 8718 (entered into force Nov. 30, 1977) [hereinafter Mexican Treaty].
This treaty is the first prison transfer treaty ratified in the United States.
2. See 123 CONG. REc. 35,020 (1977) (illustrates human rights violations alleged to have
occurred in Mexican prisons). Specific violations are mentioned throughout the paper.
3. Treaty on the Execution of Penal Sentences, Mar. 2, 1977, United States-Canada, 30
U.S.T. 6263, T.I.A.S. No. 9552 (entered into force July 19, 1978) [hereinafter Canadian Treaty].
4. Treaty on the Execution of Penal Sentences, Feb. 10, 1978, United States-Bolivia, 30
U.S.T. 796, T.I.A.S. No. 9219 (entered into force Aug. 17, 1978) [hereinafter Bolivian Treaty].
5. Treaty on the Execution of Penal Sentences, Jan. 11, 1979, United States-Panama, 32
U.S.T. 1565, T.I.A.S. No. 9787 (entered into force June 27, 1980) [hereinafter Panamanian
Treaty].
6. Treaty on the Execution of Penal Sentences, June 7, 1979, United States-Turkey, 32
U.S.T. 3187, T.I.A.S. No. 9892 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1981) [hereinafter Turkish Treaty].
See also Note, The Prisoner Transfer Treaty with Turkey: Last Run for the "Midnight Express", 85 DiCK. L. REv. 687 (1980).
7. Treaty on the Execution of Penal Sentences, July 6, 1979, United States-Peru, 32
U.S.T. 1471, T.I.A.S. No. 9784 (entered into force July 21, 1980) [hereinafter Peruvian Treaty].
8. Convention on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons, Mar. 21, 1983 (entered into force
July 1, 1985), reprinted in 22 I.L.M. 530 (1983) [hereinafter Convention Treaty]. The Convention presently is in force between Canada, France, Norway, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States.
9. Treaty on the Execution of Penal Sentences, Jan. 25, 1983, United States-France (entered into force Feb. 1, 1985), reprinted in 22 I.L.M. 542 (1983) [hereinafter French Treaty].
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force, the United States also signed a treaty with Thailand.10 The
American-Mexican Treaty on the Execution of Penal Sentence (hereinafter Mexican Treaty) served as a model for the subsequent treaties; therefore, this paper will focus primarily on this treaty.' The
Mexican Treaty and the implementing legislation are designed to alleviate hardships encountered by United States citizens incarcerated
abroad and to make their rehabilitation possible.12 Through the
treaty, both countries sought to ease strained diplomatic and law enforcement relations resulting from the incarceration of large numbers
of each country's nationals in the other country's prisons.' s Additionally, both countries hoped to increase international cooperation in
law enforcement activities. 4
Penal transfer treaties allow a United States citizen sentenced for
a crime abroad, or a foreigner sentenced in the United States, to
complete the foreign sentence in his own country.' 5 A prisoner, however, must fulfill certain conditions.'" In addition, those on parole or7
probation may also transfer after fulfilling necessary requirements.1
Although the United States has praised the prisoner transfer treaties for improving international relations and prisoner treatment
abroad, government officials and prominent scholars have questioned
10. Treaty on the Execution of Penal Sentences, Oct. 29, 1982, United States-Thailand
(treaty not yet in force), reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 384 (1982).
11. Note, American Prisoners in Foreign Prisons: The Prisoner Transfer Treaties, 2
DICK. J. INT'L L. 331, 337 (1984) (prisoner exchange treaty betwen the United States and Mex-

ico has served as a blueprint for subsequent treaties).
12. See, e.g., Letter of Submittal from Henry A. Kissinger, Sec'y of State, to President
Ford (Jan. 17, 1977), reprinted in TREATY WITH MEXICO ON THE EXECUTION OF PENAL
SENTENCES, S. EXEC. Doc. No. D, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. V (1977); Letter of Submittal from Cyrus
Vance, Sec'y of State, to President Carter (Apr. 8, 1977), reprinted in TREATY WITH CANADA ON
THE EXECUTION OF PENAL SENTENCES, S. EXEC. Doc. No. H, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. V (1977).
13. See sources cited supra note 12.
14. Id.
15. See Pisani & Simon, The United States Treaties on Transfer of Prisoners:A Survey,
17 PAC. L.J. 823, 823 (1986).
16. Id.
The general qualifications for transfer are as follows: (1) the prisoner must be a citizen or
national of the country to which he or she desires to be transferred; (2) the prisoner must
be sentenced and convicted; (3) under all but the French and Thai Treaties, the inmate
must have at least six months of the instant sentence remaining to be served; (4) there
must be no pending proceeding by way of appeal or collateral attack upon the instant
conviction or sentence; (5) the prisoner must be convicted of a crime which is generally
punishable as a crime under the laws of both countries; (6) the prisoner, as well as the
sending state and the receiving state, must all provide their consent.
Id. at 838-39.
17. See 18 U.S.C. § 4102(2) (1985) (this section gives the Attorney General authorization
to receive those offenders on parole or probation); id. § 4102(3) (this section gives the Attorney
General authorization to transfer offenders on parole or probation); id. § 4106 (this section
gives guidelines for transferring offenders on parole and parole for offenders transferred).
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the constitutionality of penal transfer.' 8 The treaties contain provisions allowing transferring states to retain exclusive jurisdiction over
any form of collateral attack on foreign sentences. 19 Receiving states,
therefore, must honor judgments and sentences of transferring
states. 0 The receiving country, however, governs parole.2 '
The Mexican Treaty received little opposition.22 However, it did
raise many constitutional concerns.23 One critical concern was that
the treaty precluded a transferred offender from challenging a Mexican conviction in the United States.24 Another major concern was enforcing foreign criminal judgments absent the normal constitutional
safeguards accorded defendants in the United States. 25 Once transferred to the United States, an offender has access to a federal court
to challenge his imprisonment,2 6 but is estopped from challenging his
conviction. 7
18. See Penal Treaties With Mexico and Canada: Hearings on Exec. Doc. D & Exec.
Doc. H. Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1977) (statement of Hon. Fortney Stark). See also infra note 23. For a general discussion of constitutional
issues arising from the penal treaties, see Abramovsky & Eagle, A Critical Evaluation of the
Mexican-American Transfer of Penal Sentences Treaty, 64 IOWA L. REv. 275 (1979); Stotzky &
Swan, Due Process Methodology and PrisonerExchange Treaties: Confronting an Uncertain
Calculus, 62 MINN. L. REV. 733 (1978); Vagts, A Reply to "A Critical Evaluation of the Mexican-American Transfer of Penal Sanctions Treaty", 64 IOWA L. REv. 325 (1979); Note, ConstitutionalProblems in the Execution of ForeignPenal Sentences: The Mexican-American Prisoner Transfer Treaties, 90 HAEV. L. REV. 1500 (1977).
19. See Bolivian Treaty, supra note 4, art. 7; Canadian Treaty, supra note 3, art. 5;
French Treaty, supra note 9, art. 7; Mexican Treaty, supra note 1, art. 6; Panamanian Treaty,
supra note 5, art. 7; Peruvian Treaty, supra note 7, art. 7; Turkish Treaty, supra note 6, art. 9.
20.

See sources cited supra note 19.

21. See Bolivian Treaty, supra note 4, art. 6, § 2; Canadian Treaty, supra note 3, art. 4, §
1; Mexican Treaty, supra note 1, art. 5, § 2; Panamanian Treaty, supra note 5, art. 6, § 2;
Peruvian Treaty, supra note 7, art. 6, § 2; Turkish Treaty, supra note 6, art. 20, § 1. See also 18
U.S.C. §§ 4102(2), 4102(3), 4106 (1985).
22. See Implementation of Treaties for the Transfer of Offenders to or from Foreign
Countries: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Immigration, Citizenship, & Int'l Law of the
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) [hereinafter House Judiciary
Hearings].
23. Id. at 2, 123, 134, 177, 178 & 227 (discussing possible constitutional problems with
allowing the transferring country to retain control over the sentence). See also Rosado v. Civiletti, 621 F.2d 1179 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 856, reh'g denied, 449 U.S. 1027 (1980).
24.

House JudiciaryHearings, supra note 22, at 2, 123, 134, 177, 178 & 227.

25. Remarks by the Honorable Hamilton Fish, Jr., Meeting of Ass'n of the Bar of the City
of New York (May 17, 1978) (discussing constitutional concerns regarding prisoner transfer
issues).
26.

Rosado, 621 F.2d 1179 (2d Cir. 1980).

27.

See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
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II. DUE PROCESS
Due process originated in English common law"8 to alleviate capricious judicial proceedings and arbitrary imprisonment by the
king.29 The fifth and fourteenth amendments to the United States
Constitution guarantee full due process of law.3 0 The framers introduced the due process clause into the fifth amendment in 1789.31 The
Supreme Court's initial interpretations of the due process clause restricted the concept to its common law roots.3 2 The Court soon realized, however, that the adaptable nature of the Constitution required
ever-changing judicial interpretations.3 3 The ratification of the fourteenth amendment 4 forced the Supreme Court either to distinguish
between the due process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments or to confirm their singularity of meaning. 35 The latter result
28. L. McGEHEE, DUE PROCESS OF LAW UNDER THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 3 (1906). The
roots of due process originated in the Magna Carta under King John of England in 1215. Id.
29.

R. MOTT, DUE PROCESS OF LAW 3 (1926). This version of the Magna Carta is referred

to as "Section 29." See id. at 3 n.7. See also McIlwain, Due Processof Law in Magna Carta, 14
COLUM. L. REV. 27, 51 (1914). Section 39 stated: "No freeman shall be taken and imprisoned or
disseized or exiled or in any way destroyed, nor will we go upon him nor send upon him, except
by the lawful judgment of his peers and by the law of the land." R. MoTr, supra, at 3. Later
Kings modified the document, but the basic concept remained the protection of individual
rights and the administration of governmental sanctity. See L. McGEHEE, supra note 28, at 17.
The phrase "due process of law" was first used in "Statute of 28 Edward III (Sometimes called
'the Statute of Westminster of the Liberties of London'), ch. iii, 1 Statutes of the Realm, p.
345." R. MOTT, supra, at 37.
30. See U.S. CONST. amends. V & XIV.
31. R. MOTT, supra note 29, at 154 n.44. The pertinent part of the fifth amendment
provides:
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a
presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury ...

nor shall any person

. . .

be compelled

in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law ....
amend. V. Americans were motivated by arbitrary colonial penal laws and unfair
restrictions imposed by the British prior to the American Revolution to seek a system reflecting
personal rights and a fair system of justice. R. MOTT, supra note 29, at 37.
32. Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. 272 (1855). Justice
Curtis asserted that British common law, rather than Congress or the judiciary, should determine the scope of due process. Id.
33. See Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884). Justice Mathews asserted that although due process is directly attributable to old English common law, the framers drafted the
Constitution to adapt to a changing society. Id. at 529-31. He further contended that due process must be the result of judicial practice in accord with the times. Id. at 531.
34. The states ratified the fourteenth amendment in response to the struggle inherent in
the Civil War era. See L. McGEHEE, supra note 28, at 19. The drafters of the amendment
intended to secure the freedom of the blacks granted citizenship after the Civil War. Id. at 2021. The pertinent part of the amendment provides that a state cannot "deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property without due process of law .... " U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
35. See French v. Barber Asphalt Paving Co., 181 U.S. 324, 329 (1901) (The Court asserted that because both amendments were drafted at different times and under different cirU.S. CONST.
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finally prevailed.3 6 Each amendment, however, functions differently.
The fifth amendment protects United States residents against arbitrary federal legislation impairing life, liberty, and property.3 7 The
fourteenth amendment protects state residents against arbitrary
state legislation."8
Essentially, due process is a means of protecting one's liberties
through individual equality and competent tribunals.3 9 It safeguards
citizens against governmental noncomformity by promoting fundamental principles of legality. 0 Historically, the scope of due process
protection has been justifiably extended to encompass modern developments in the law."'
The requirements of due process vary case by case. However, justice requires that an offender is entitled to a fair hearing to present
defenses, address charges, and submit evidence in his favor.4 2 Prior to
this hearing, adequate notice must be given.4 3 Adequate notice entails ample opportunity to prepare
for hearing.4 4 Reference to such
4
1
process dates back to Edward IV.
The United States Constitution considers notice and a fair hearing, along with trial by jury for infamous crimes, to be essential to
due process of law. 46 The federal government also requires that
courts have jurisdiction before due process is met. The United
States, however, may defer to foreign judgments. 48 By deferring, the
United States acknowledges that foreign countries may have concepts
of due process sufficiently similar to American concepts to satisfy our
cumstances, different applications may be proper. However, the Court eventually conceded that
due process has the same meaning under both amendments.).
36. Id.
37. Hibben v. Smith, 191 U.S. 310, 325 (1907).
38. Id.
39. See L. McGEHEE, supra note 28, at 3. See also Hibben v. Smith, 191 U.S. 310, 325
(1907); supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
40. R. Mo'rr, supra note 29, at 604. Mott vehemently asserts that remedies must be
sought for courts practicing judicial perversion. Id.
41. Id.
42. See L. McGEHEE, supra note 28, at 73-76. See also Rosado v. Civiletti, 621 F.2d 1179,
1197 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 856, reh'g denied, 449 U.S. 1027 (1980) (Only due process
requirements relevant to the topic are listed).
43. L. McGEHEE, supra note 28, at 73-76.
44. Id. at 73.
45. Simon v. Craft, 182 U.S. 427, 436 (1901); Hooker v. Los Angeles, 128 U.S. 314, 318
(1888).
46. RoleIr v. Holly, 176 U.S. 398 (1900). See also L. McGEHEE, supra note 28, at 75-76.
47. For an overview of the jurisdiction requirement, see L. McGEHEE, supra note 28, at
86-137.
48. Rosado, 621 F.2d 1179, 1197 (2d Cir. 1980) (The court stated, however, almost no due
process was afforded to the offenders. Implicitly, the court apparently would have upheld the
proceedings if reasonable due process was given.). See also Maier, Resolving Extraterritorial
Conflicts or "There and Back Again", 25 VA. J. INT'L L. 7, 13-16 (1984).
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notion of fairness. Such systems would undoubtedly include fair proceedings and the recognition of fundamental rights of alleged offenders. 49 Thus, the United States will honor foreign judgments obtained
in accord with historical concepts of due process. However, two situations may arise which compromise due process. First, a foreign country may have insufficient due process concepts embodied in its law.
Second, a foreign country may have due process safeguards but fails
to apply them.
Due process of law protects both United States citizens and residents within United States boundaries.6 0 One cannot be sentenced
without due process of law. Furthermore, a defendant may challenge
his sentence if such sentence is contrary to this right. Under the
terms of prison exchange treaties, however, prisoners must not only
consent to transfer"' but must also agree that only the transferring
state can modify the conviction 2 or the sentence. 3 To activate the
treaty, therefore, one must waive certain constitutional rights. A conflict thus arises between the right of due process and the requirements of prisoner exchange treaties. The Constitution does not provide for preemption by treaty. Although the fifth amendment's
guarantee of due process provides all persons the right to a fair trial
prior to imprisonment in the United States, " some foreign countries
do not afford an American prisoner the same protection.

III.

TREATIES AND THE CONSTITUTION

A treaty is an international compact between independent nations." The Constitution provides that the President "shall have
Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make
Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur."66
Prior to 1957 the power relationship between treaties and the
Constitution was unsettled. The supremacy clause of the United
States Constitution declares that treaties, as well as the Constitution
49. 621 F.2d at 1197.
50. See Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 236 (1896); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118
U.S. 356, 369 (1886) (generally discussing that the fourteenth amendment due process protects
residents as well as citizens). See also L. McGEHEE, supra note 28, at 189.
51. 18 U.S.C. § 4108 (1985). See also Bolivian Treaty, supra note 4, art. 5, § 3; Canadian
Treaty, supra note 3, art. 3, § 10; Convention Treaty, supra note 8, art. 7; French Treaty, supra
note 9, arts. 2(c) & 12, § 2; Mexican Treaty, supra note 1, art. 4, § 2; Panamanian Treaty, supra
note 5, art. 3, § 6; Peruvian Treaty, supra note 7, art. 5(9); Turkish Treaty, supra note 6, art.

N(f).
52.
53.
54.

55.
56.

See sources cited supra note 51.
Id.
Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436, 440 (1886).
See BLACKS LAW DIcrIoNARv 1346 (5th ed. 1979).
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
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and Acts of Congress, are the supreme law of the land.5" In 1920 Justice Holmes delivered an ambiguous statement suggesting that treaties were not subject to constitutional limitations." The question of
whether a treaty could be enforced when contrary to constitutional
prohibitions remained unanswered until Justice Black's opinion in
Reid v. Covert."
The Reid Court found a 1942 agreement in conflict with the Constitution.6 0 This agreement" granted the United States military exclusive jurisdiction over American servicemen and their dependents
for crimes committed while residing in Great Britain and Northern
Ireland. 62 In Reid, a civilian wife killed her husband, who was a serviceman in the United States Air Force.6 3 Pursuant to the agreement,
the Air Force tried her under the Uniform Code of Military Justice
(UCMJ). 64 While awaiting a retrial,65 she petitioned for a writ of
habeas corpus on ground that she was entitled to a civil rather than a
military trial."6 She emphatically asserted that her conviction under
the UCMJ violated her constitutional rights.6 7 She implicitly contended that the UCMJ did not provide certain procedural safeguards
57. Id. art. VI, § 2. This article provides that: "This Constitution, and the Laws of the
United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall
be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land.
Id.
58. See Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920).
Acts of Congress are the supreme law of the land only when made in pursuance of the
Constitution, while treaties are declared to be so when made under the authority of the
United States. It is open to question whether the authority of the United States means
more than the formal acts prescribed to make the convention.
Id.
59. 354 U.S. 1, 16 (1957).
60. Id.
61. Id. The agreement was an executive agreement. Id. at 15. An executive agreement is a
treaty-like agreement in which the President can bind a foreign state without the advice and
consent of the Senate. BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 55, at 511. Justice Black, however,
apparently analyzed the executive agreement as if it was a treaty. See Reid, 354 U.S. at 16-18
(Justice Black discussing treaties in the context of the case). This leads the reader to believe
that the substantive analysis is to be applied to treaties as well as to an executive agreement.
Additionally, the agreement is implicitly referred to as a treaty within the case itself. See, e.g.,
id. at 79.
62. Agreement Respecting Jurisdiction over Criminal Offenses Committed by Foreign
Forces, July 27, 1942, Great Britain-Northern Ireland-United States, 57 Stat. 1193, E.A.S. No.
355.
63. 354 U.S. at 3. He was killed at an airbase in England. Id.
64. Id. She was tried by a court martial, which was composed of military officers. Id.
65. Id. She initially was found guilty, but the judgment was later reversed due to prejudicial errors concerning her defense. Id.
66. Id. at 4.
67. Id.
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guaranteed by the Constitution, such as a trial by jury.68
The Supreme Court ruled in her favor6 9 and held unconstitutional
that portion of the agreement subjecting civilian military dependents
to UCMJ jurisdiction.70 Justice Black reasoned that "[no] agreement
with a foreign nation can confer power on the Congress, or on any
other branch of government, which is free from the restraints of the
Constitution. '7 1 The Reid decision confirmed that the wording of the
supremacy clause does not suggest that treaties and the laws enacted
pursuant to them are free from constitutional restraints.7 2 Justice
Black added that allowing the United States to exercise a treaty in
conflict with the Constitution would be contrary to the drafters' intent.7 3 The drafters formulated restraints to apply to all branches. 7 '
Neither the President, nor the President and the Senate together,
can override the prohibitions of the Constitution. 75 The Court thus
confirmed that the Constitution is and has been uniformly recognized
as superior to a treaty.76
Reid illustrates that treaties are subject to constitutional limitations and cannot contradict constitutional prohibitions. The decision
mandates careful scrutiny of treaties vulnerable to constitutional
challenges." Prisoner exchange treaties have been subject to such
68. See generally id. She did not receive a trial by jury. Id. at 3.
69. Id. at 41.
70. Id. at 35.
71. Id. at 16.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 17. Furthermore, Justice Black stated that debates prior to the formulation and
ratification of the Constitution did not imply such a conclusion. Id. He additionally noted:
These debates as well as the history that surrounds the adoption of the treaty provision
in Article VI makes it clear that the reason treaties were not limited to those made in
"pursuance" of the Constitution was so that agreements made by the United States
under the Articles of Confederation, including the important peace treaties which concluded the Revolutionary War, would remain in effect.
Id. at 16-17.
74. Id.
75. See id.
76. Id. See also Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258 (1890). Mr. Justice Field said:
The treaty power as expressed in the Constitution, is in terms unlimited except by those
restraints which are found in that instrument against the action of the government or of
its departments, and those arising from the nature of the government itself and of that
of the states. It would not be contended that it extends so far as to authorize what the
Constitution forbids, or a change in the character of the government or in that of one of
the states, or a cession of any portion of the territory of the latter, without its consent.
Id. at 267. Cf: Reid, 354 U.S. at 17 n.33 (list of cases supporting the proposition that the Constitution is supreme over a treaty); id. at 5-6 ("The United States is entirely a creature of the
Constitution.").
77. See Note, supra note 11, at 342 ("[I]t is clear that any treaty to which the United
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scrutiny. Since the inception of the prison transfer treaties, they have
been susceptible to constitutional attack and court challenges. 78 Notably, challenges often occur once prisoners are transferred to the
United States. 7 91 No such prisoner, however, has prevailed in attacking the transferred conviction." Under the terms of the treaties, a
United States citizen, subsequent to transfer from a foreign country,
81
cannot raise issues of due process in a United States courtroom.
Throughout the history of prison exchange treaties, this has been a
formidable concern.

IV.

THE HISTORY OF THE TREATY

Early in 1975 families and friends of Americans imprisoned in foreign countries sent letters to the State Department concerning treatment of Americans in foreign prisons.8 2 They alleged foreign countries were holding Americans under deplorable conditions.8 " Foreign
governments gave many prisoners sentences greatly exceeding those
given for similar crimes in the United States.8 " Witnesses 5 complained that treatment of Americans was contingent upon the
amount they could pay jail officials.8 6 Witnesses further asserted that
excessive delays often ensued before the foreign government informed United States Consular officials about incarcerated Americans. Overall, the witnesses considered State Department action
87
inadequate.
The State Department responded to these complaints and to congressional pressure."' Additionally, Congress began a year of hearings
on this issue.8 9 During these hearings, representatives of the DepartStates wishes to become a party will likely undergo careful scrutiny by Congress to discover and
correct any provisions which look as though they might be susceptible to constitutional challenge."). See also, e.g., 87 C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 1 (1907).
78. See, e.g., Rosado v. Civiletti, 621 F.2d 1179 (2d Cir. 1980); Pfeiffer v. United States
Bureau of Prisons, 615 F.2d 873 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 908 (1980); Velez v. Nelson,
475 F. Supp. 865 (D. Conn. 1979), rev'd sub nom., Rosado v. Civiletti, 621 F.2d 1179 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 856, reh'g denied, 449 U.S. 1027 (1980).
79. See cases cited supra note 78.
80. E.g., id.
81. See H.R. REP. No. 720, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 41, reprinted in 1977 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 3146, 3164 [hereinafter HOUSE REPORTS].
82. See House Judiciary Hearings, supra note 22, at 1 (gives background information
leading to the prisoner exchange treaties); HousE REPORTS, supra note 81 (same).
83. See sources cited supra note 82.
84. Id. Many of the prisoners were being held for drug offenses. Id.
85. These witnesses were primarily parents of the incarcerated Americans. HOUSE REPORTS,

86.
87.
88.
89.

supra note 81, at 7.
See sources cited supra note 82.
Id.
Id.
See generally U.S. Citizens Imprisoned in Mexico: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
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ments of State and Justice and members of Congress substantiated
many of the complaints, especially those concerning Mexican prisons.90 Congressional and State Department investigations revealed
numerous human rights violations in Mexican institutions.9 1 Congressmen reported the Mexican government failed to inform American prisoners of their rights and forced them to sign confessions written in Spanish without interpretation. 2 Prisoners suffered physical
torture and could not communicate with others outside the prison.93
Reports further revealed prisoners were denied fair trials and access
to the United States Embassy. 4
The hearings resulted in the Legislature formulating a joint resolution concerning Americans incarcerated in Mexico.95 The resolution
required Congress to respect fundamental human rights while enforcing international cooperation agreements designed to alleviate drug
trafficking. 6 It additionally requested the President to ensure human
rights are internationally respected in law enforcement.91
Subsequent to the House hearings, the United States contemplated executing a prisoner transfer treaty with Mexico.9 8 The federal
government believed such a treaty would be an effective solution to
some of the problems arising in Mexican prisons.9 Negotiations ensued, and on November 25, 1976, Mexico and the United States
signed a treaty to transfer penal sentences.' At approximately the
10
same time, Canada and the United States signed a similar treaty.
These treaties were to be precedent for future prisoner transfer treaties with other countries. 02 The Senate in 1977 consented to ratification of the Mexican and Canadian treaties on July 19 and July 21,
respectively. 103

From inception, governmental officials and scholars have quesInt'l Political and Military Affairs of the House Comm. on Int'l Relations (I-III), 94th Cong.,
1st & 2d Sess. (1975-1976) (these hearings discuss concerns of United States citizens incarcerated in Mexico) [hereinafter House hearings].
90. See HousE REPORTS, supra note 81, at 2.
91. See House Hearings, supra note 89, at 5 (remarks of Rep. Starke).
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. See Pisani & Simon, supra note 15, at 829.
96. See 22 U.S.C. § 2291 (1982).
97. Id.
98. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
99. Id.
100. See Mexican Treaty, supra note 1; see also supra text accompanying note 1.
101. See Canadian Treaty, supra note 3; see also supra text accompanying note 3.
102. See supra notes 4-10 and accompanying text.
103. See HousE REPORTS, supra note 81, at 2.
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tioned the constitutionality of the treaties.1 04 A major concern included the restrictions on a transferred offender to challenge his conviction and imprisonment abroad. 10 5 During a hearing regarding the
treaties' constitutionality, government officials analogized prisoner
transfer treaties to extradition treaties.'0
The Supreme Court has held in extradition cases, that the Constitution is not viable with regard to crimes perpetrated outside United
States jurisdiction.1 0 7 Thus, an American may not challenge a foreign
proceeding in contradiction to the Constitution.0 8 Deputy Attorney
General Flaherty argued because the United States extradites offenders to countries not practicing procedures compatible with the United
States, procedural safeguards should be unavailable to an American
after his conviction abroad and subsequent transfer to this country.10 9 The United States normally sustains the validity of foreign
convictions.1 10 Moreover, foreign convictions historically have been
subjected to limited judicial scrutiny.' Government officials thus arhis
gued the treaties do not abrogate a prisoner's right to challenge
12
existed.
ever
right
no
because
States
conviction in the United
Another problem discussed at the hearing concerned the consent
provision. 1 8 The issue was whether consent is voluntary when a prisoner has no viable alternative. 1 4 Flaherty asserted that if a guilty
plea entered to avoid a death penalty is not inherently involuntary,5
then consent under these circumstances likewise is not involuntary."
He added that foreign countries would not have negotiated the treaties absent a provision prohibiting collateral attack on their
judgments. 116
104. See generally Robbins, A ConstitutionalAnalysis of the ProhibitionAgainst Collateral Attack in the Mexican-American PrisonerExchange Treaty, 26 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1 (1978)
(discussing constitutional questions arising from the prisoner exchange treaties); Stotzky &
Swan, supra note 18 (same); Note, supra note 18 (same). See also supra note 23 and accompanying text.
105. See House Judiciary Hearings, supra note 22, at 1 (statement by Hon. Joshua
Eilberg, Chairman of the Subcommittee).
106. Id. at 125 (statement of Peter F. Flaherty, Deputy Attorney General, Dep't of
Justice).
107. Id.
108. Id. See also Neely v. Henkel, 180 U.S. 109 (1901).
109. See supra note 76.
110. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
111. House Judiciary Hearings, supra note 22, at 134 (statement from Larry A. Hammond, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel to Peter F. Flaherty).
112. Id. at 125 (statement of Peter F. Flaherty).
113. Id.
114. Id. If a prisoner wants to transfer, he has no choice but to consent. The issue then, is
whether this is a voluntary consent when the offender has no options. Id.
115. Id. at 126.
116. Id.
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Immediately following the signing of the first treaties, both scholars and the witnesses at the many treaty hearings agreed that the
treaties' constitutionality could be upheld.'1 1 The treaties and implementing legislation, however, were challenged. Shortly following the
first return of American prisoners from Mexico, several prisoners
filed actions for habeas corpus relief, challenging their imprisonment
in this country.
In Velez v. Nelson," 8 three United States citizens attacked their
Mexican-imposed sentences in federal district court after returning
to the United States pursuant to the Mexican Treaty." 9 While imprisoned in the United States, petitioners challenged their incarceration. Petitioners were subjected to deplorable and heinous treatment
during their arrest and twenty-five-month Mexican imprisonment. 2 0
Mexican prison officials and forceful inmates threatened to severely
beat petitioners if they refused to pay exorbitant fees for basic necessities.' 21 The aborted legal procedure in Mexico additionally deprived
petitioners of any due process protection.' 2 2 No petitioner appeared
before a judge or jury, nor did the government allow the petitioners
to speak or present evidence in their behalf during their dubious trial
23
lasting less than fifteen minutes.
The federal district court granted the petition for habeus corpus,
focusing primarily on the surrounding circumstances precipitating
petitioners' consent. 24 The court, relying on precedent, determined
that "voluntariness" depends on the circumstances at large. Consent
procured through brutality or other inhumane methods is constitutionally suspect. 25 In accord with these principles, the court found
117. See, e.g., Robbins, supra note 104; Stotsky & Swan, supra note 18; Vagts, supra note
18; Comment, The Mexican-American Penal Sentence Treaty: A Run-On Sentence, 6 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 149 (1978). But see Abramovsky, A Critical Evaluation of the American
Transfer of Penal Sanctions Policy, 1980 Wis. L. REV. 25; Abramovsky & Eagle, supra note 18;
Note, The Impasse of Rosado v. Civiletti on U.S. PrisonerTransfer Treaties, 21 VA. J. INT'L L.
1 (1980).
118. 475 F. Supp. 865 (D. Conn. 1979), rev'd sub nom., Rosado v. Civiletti, 621 F. 2d 1179
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 856, reh'g denied, 449 U.S. 1027 (1980).
119. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
120. 475 F. Supp. at 867-69. Without a warrant, six armed men searched, interrogated,
and arrested the petitioners. One petitioner was electrically shocked on his mouth and testicles
and later was hung by his arm for an entire day. A second petitioner received similar treatment.
A third petitioner was also shocked by the prod and later choked with a plastic bag. The first
petitioner described the second petitioner after his return from interrogation as having a swollen face including burns and bruises covering his body. The first petitioner testified "lilt was
better to be dead than receive all that punishment." Id. at 869 n.10.
121. Id. at 874.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 871.
124. Id. at 874.
125. Id.
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petitioners would have done anything to escape their conditions.
Under the unique facts of this case, therefore, the consent was not
voluntary as required by the treaty; consequently, it was invalid.' 2 6
The court also used the above analysis to justify jurisdiction.127
The Ninth Circuit contradicted Velez' holding by affirming the
district court decision in Pfeifer v. United States Bureau of Prisons.128 In Pfeifer, a prisoner was transferred to the United States
pursuant to the Mexican Treaty.' 29 The prisoner filed a petition for
habeas corpus asserting a violation of his due process rights resulting
in a constitutionally invalid incarceration."' Moreover, he contended
he involuntarily consented to transfer."' The district court held the
United States may constitutionally imprison Americans extraterritorily convicted under procedures less protective than United
2
States standards."1
The Ninth Circuit, in affirming the lower court's ruling, held the
treaty constitutionally valid despite its support of foreign convictions
potentially violating American notions of due process.'
Additionally, the court found that, under the terms of the treaty, the prisoner's consent was voluntary and the duress of inhumane treatment
did not invalidate his consent.""
The wave of cases validiting the treaty continued with Rosado v.
Civiletti."6 In Rosado, the Velez petitioners appealed to the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals." 6 The court unanimously held petitioners
were estopped from attacking the Mexican convictions' validity because each had intelligently and voluntarily agreed to challenge them
only in Mexico." 7 The court, however, reaffirmed the federal courts'
authority to hear due process claims raised by citizens incarcerated
within United States territorial jurisdiction." 8
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. 615 F.2d 873 (9th Cir. 1980), aff'g 468 F. Supp. 920 (S.D. Cal. 1979).
129. 468 F. Supp. 920, 921 (S.D. Cal. 1979), aff'd, 615 F.2d 873 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
447 U.S. 908 (1980).
130. 468 F. Supp. at 921.
131. Id. at 925.
132. Id. at 926, 927.
133. 615 F.2d at 876.
134. Id. at 877. The lower court stated if inhumane treatment was the test to invalidate
consent, no offender could consent to transfer. 468 F. Supp. 920 (S.D. Cal. 1979).
135. Rosado v. Civiletti, 621 F.2d 1179 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 856, reh'g denied,
449 U.S. 1027 (1980), aff'g sub nom. Velez v. Nelson, 475 F. Supp. 865 (D. Conn. 1979) (Rosado
was the appeal of Velez).
136. 621 F.2d at 1182; see also id. at 1183 n.9 (prisoners, although on parole, remained in
custody and asserted habeas corpus remedy).
137. Id. at 1182.
138. Id. The court assumed habeas corpus jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (1976),
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Petitioners contended their consent was based on duress and coercion making their continued confinement a violation of their fifth
amendment due process rights. 139 However, the court followed the
lower court's determination that petitioners' decision to adhere to
Mexican jurisdiction was an informed choice,140 and determined that
policy considerations apparently rendered it voluntary. District Court
Judge Kaufman asserted the issue of voluntariness should not be a
means to overcome the specific intent underlying the consent provision or the treaty's general purpose." 41 The United States had1 42a

strong policy interest in recognizing Mexican criminal judgments.
According to Judge Kaufman, the United States would be unable to
deter Mexican officials from perpetrating future inhumane acts if it
failed to honor the validity and integrity of Mexican judgments.1

43

At

best, he added, the United States would only complicate the prisoner
issue.' 44 The paramount concern was alleviating the misery of current

and future Americans incarcerated in Mexico.' 4 5 Judge Kaufman
feared these Americans would be unable to escape the atrocities inMexican criminal system without strict adherence to
herent in the
146
the treaty.

V.

TREATY BENEFITS

Despite the controversy surrounding the due process issue, the
prisoner exchange treaties provide many benefits. First, as noted in
Rosado, the treaties foster better international relations among participating nations. 147 The underlying purpose of each treaty is the
easing of international tensions created by the imprisonment of large
numbers of one country's citizens by the other country. 48 The treawhich states that federal courts may issue writs of habeas corpus to those held in violation of
the United States Constitution, laws or treaties.
139. Id. See supra note 31 for relevant portion of the fifth amendment.
140. 621 F.2d at 1199, 1200.
141. Id. at 1200.
142. Id. at 1190, 1200. See also Letter of Transmittal from President Carter to the Sen-

ate of the United States (Feb. 15, 1977), reprinted in TREATY WITH MEXICO ON THE EXECUTION
OF PENAL SENTENCES, S. EXEC. Doc. D, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. i11 (1977); Letter of Transmittal
from President Carter to the Senate of the United States (Apr. 18, 1977), reprinted in TREATY
WITH CANADA ON THE EXECUTION OF PENAL SENTENCES, S. EXEC. Doc. H., 95th Cong., 1st Sess.
I1 (1977); supra note 12 and accompanying text.
143. 621 F.2d at 1190.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 1190, 1200.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 1200.
148. See sources cited supra note 12 and accompanying text. See also House Judiciary
hearings, supra note 22, at 1 (recognizing that over 2300 Americans are incarcerated abroad,
including 600 in Mexico). Historically, more Americans are incarcerated in Mexico than any
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ties help relieve both diplomatic and law enforcement concerns. 149
Additionally, the treaties aid in establishing closer cooperation in international law enforcement. 50 The prisoner transfer treaties have
become -important facets of international relations between active
nations.
Second, the treaties benefit Americans imprisoned in foreign
countries. The treaties, by allowing American prisoners to complete
their terms in the United States, relieve prisoners from the inherent
hardships of foreign incarceration, thereby increasing their chances
for rehabilitation.'15 Transfer to the United States usually entails incarceration in cleaner and safer prison facilities'52 without the alienation and discrimination inherent in foreign prisons. 53 Prisoner morale may improve because of increased communication with others
and familiarity with certain customs.5 4 Transfer also allows a prisoner greater access to family, friends and counsel.' 55 A more important benefit is the prisoner's opportunity for parole.' 56 United States
parole laws are generally more lenient than their foreign counterparts. 5 7 Offenders have a better chance of release in the United
States. Thus, a prisoner's overall interests and his rehabilitation are
enhanced through transfer.
Careful examination of these benefits compels reversal of Velez.
Sanctioning the Velez decision precludes desparate Americans from
escaping substandard conditions in foreign prisons.158 Upholding
Rosado not only benefits Americans incarcerated abroad, but also improves United States international relations. Allowing American
transferees to challenge foreign convictions subsequent to transfer diminishes United States credibility in foreign affairs.
other foreign country. See Pisani & Simon, supra note 15, at 828-30.
149.

See Rosado, 621 F.2d at 1200.

150.

See sources cited supra note 12 and accompanying text.

151.

See id.

152.

Abramovsky & Eagle, supra note 18, at 294.

153.

Id.

154. Prisoners in America have been known to celebrate holidays and enjoy recreational
activities.
155.

See Velez, 475 F. Supp. 865 (D. Conn. 1979).

156.

See Note, supra note 117, at 135.

157.

See id. at 168.

See also 18 U.S.C. §§ 4102, 4106 (1985).

158. See Rosado, 621 F.2d at 1183 n.10 (discussing that a note from Mexican officials
threatened to discontinue future transfers because of Judge Daly's decision in Velez). See also
HousE REPORTS, supra note 81, at 26 (stating incarceration in one's own country is sufficiently
severe punishment).
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CONSTITUTIONAL DEFECTS OF THE TREATY

Despite numerous benefits, however, prisoner transfer treaties adversely affect the interrelation between treaties and the Constitution.
As previously illustrated by Reid, treaties are subject to constitutional prohibitions and limitations. 15 These treaties, however, directly contradict this constitutional premise. Government officials
cite disparate caselaw to justify the constitutionality of the transfer
treaties.160
In Neely v. Henkel, 6 ' a foreign nation sought to extradite petitioner pursuant to a treaty. The petitioner was an American citizen
living in the United States who committed a crime in the foreign
country. 62 Petitioner alleged the extradition treaty lacked constitutional safeguards, thereby rendering it unconstitutional.' s The Supreme Court, while deeming the extradition valid, concluded the
Constitution is inapplicable to crimes committed in foreign nations.""' Justice Harlan stated American citizenship does not grant
immunity to perpetrate crimes in foreign countries. 6 5 American citizens committing crimes in foreign nations cannot thereafter complain
when required to submit to those countries' legal proceedings unless
the treaty otherwise stipulates. 6 Justice Harlan also asserted that
specific safeguards protect against unreasonable extradition. One can
only be extradited upon evidence establishing probable cause of guilt
as weighed in a fair and impartial trial in the receiving country. 16 7
Neely does not provide a proper analogy to prison transfer treaties. Unlike cases involving prison transfer, Neely involved extradition only to those foreign countries generally practicing fair and impartial legal procedures. The United States, however, does not
require that a party to a transfer treaty practice fair legal procedure.
159. 354 U.S. 1.
160. E.g., Rosado, 621 F.2d at 1195; House Judiciary Hearings, supra note 22, at 125
(statement of Peter F. Flaherty, Deputy Attorney General, Dep't of Justice); id. at 133-34
(memorandum from Larry A. Hammond, Acting Ass't Attorney General).
161. 180 U.S. 109 (1901). See also House Judiciary Hearings, supra note 22, at 125
(statement of Peter F. Flaherty, Deputy Attorney General, Dep't of Justice). Neely has been
cited as a justification for the constitutionality of the transfer treaties because no cases were on
point during congressional hearings accompanying the treaties' ratification and implementing
legislation.
162. 180 U.S. at 112-14.
163. Id. at 114.
164. Id. at 122.
165. Id. at 123.
166. Id.
167. Id. Justice Harlan further stated the fair and impartial trial need not necessarily be
in accord with that prescribed in the United States, but to that accorded citizens in the country
where the offense was committed. However, the offender may not be discriminated against because of his American citizenship. Id.
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Moreover, the treaties fail to provide for possible prejudice against
American citizens. An American transferee's foreign conviction is enforceable regardless of inadequacies in due process. Thus, extradition
is not analagous to prison transfer.
In ruling the extradition valid, the Neely court merely recognized
that certain nations practice adequate due process procedures. Subsequent courts have recognized that the presumption of fairness customarily afforded foreign courts may be withheld upon a showing
that extradition would subject offenders to an unfair trial.168 These
decisions clarify the issue inherent in all transfer cases: whether the
incarceration of Americans within the United States is constitutionally valid if based on suspect foreign proceedings.
Before one may be incarcerated in the United States, the Bill of
Rights requires due process of law. " A transfer treaty permits incarceration in an American prison without due process. Scholars have
suggested that the prohibition against collateral review of foreign
judgments is not unconstitutional if the offender waives his constitutional privilege of review. 17 0 A waiver is valid, however, only if know2
ingly, intelligently and voluntarily made.17 1 In the House hearings 1
Flaherty cited Brady v.United States173 to justify the treaties' consent provisions. Brady, however, is clearly inadequate authority for
this justification.
In Brady, petitioner claimed his fear of the death penalty compelled him to waive his constitutional right to trial and plead
guilty.1 7 4 The Supreme Court held that, although petitioner was discouraged from asserting his innocence, his guilty plea was still voluntary. 7 5 Flaherty asserted by analogy to Brady that, if a guilty plea is
voluntary although partially precipitated by fear of the death penalty, then a prisoner's consent under the transfer treaty would also be
76
voluntary.
This analogy, however, is inapposite. First, the Brady petitioner
received adequate due process protection at his arrest, trial, and sub168. See Rosado, 621 F.2d at 1195. See also, e.g., United States ex rel. Bloomfield v.
Gengler, 507 F.2d 925 (2d Cir. 1974) (states that there are situations where the United States
would not want to exercise its extradition authority); Gallina v. Fraser, 278 F.2d 77, 79 (2d Cir.)
(same), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 851 (1960).
169. See supra notes 40-50 and accompanying text. See also supra note 168.
170. E.g., Note, supra note 18, at 1526.
171. See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938). See also Brady v. United States, 397
U.S. 742, 748 (1970).
172. See House JudiciaryHearings, supra note 22, at 126.
173. 397 U.S. 742 (1970).
174. Id. at 744-45.
175. Id. at 746-48.
176. Id. at 744-45.
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sequent conviction. A prisoner under the instant circumstances may
not receive such protection. 177 Second, in Brady, the petitioner's decision was based on his own collateral fear of the possible results accompanying his adequately protected proceedings. Under the prisoner transfer treaty, a prisoner's choices might be transfer, or
death.176 Thus, voluntariness becomes a relative term.
Many commentators argue policy to justify use of the Brady
Court's definition of consent in the transfer treaty context. Unless
the treaties preclude collateral attacks in American courts, foreign
countries will not ratify them.7 9 While this is a worthy argument, the
treaties are nevertheless in conflict with the Constitution.
Although the prison transfer treaties benefit helpless Americans
incarcerated abroad, they have inherent constitutional defects. The
Constitution provides for no deprivation of life or liberty without due
process of law.'8 0 Because an American cannot raise due process challenges once transferred to the United States, the treaties do not safeguard this right. Neely and Brady implicitly recognize fairness as an
integral part of our legal system. Transfer treaties apparently are the
result of a strong underlying policy; unfortunately, they implement
this policy at the expense of the Constitution. For the Constitution to
maintain its authority, international agreements should not subvert
its content. Moreover, inadequate analogies such as Neely and Brady
cannot justify this subversion.
VII.

SUGGESTED ALTERNATIVES

Recognizing inherent constitutional conflicts in the penal sanctions treaties, scholars have suggested alternatives to effectuate the
purpose of the treaties while eliminating some of their constitutional
problems. Specifically, some scholars have recommended a system
under which American offenders arrested in Mexico could be tried in
American courts.' These authors suggest that legislation such as the
Controlled Substance Act"8 2 coupled with extradition treaties would
enable domestic courts to try American offenders who commit criminal acts abroad."' The advantages of this approach are twofold.
First, Americans confined abroad would be afforded due process because the trial would be held in the United States. Second, prisoners
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.

Due process issues arise when the prisoner is not afforded a fair trial.
See, e.g., Rosado, 621 F.2d at 1179.
See, e.g., id. at 1200-01; House Judiciary Hearings, supra note 22, at 46.
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
See Abramovsky & Eagle, supra note 18, at 322-23.
21 U.S.C. § 959 (1983).
See Abramovsky & Eagle, supra note 18, at 294.
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would not have to endure the harsh reality of extensive incarceration
in foreign prisons.
One scholar, however, contends this idea would needlessly provoke a nation which "link[s] the concept of extraterritoriality with
nineteenth century gunboat diplomacy.'

84

Moreover, this author as-

serts that Mexican officials probably would not cooperate in such
proceedings. 85 The Mexican Constitution prohibits foreign courts
from intervening in matters within its jurisdiction. 86
The author advocates another approach to the problem. He suggests the United States furnish legal representation to the Americans
incarcerated abroad.18 7 Although provisions of the Mexican Constitution contain protections similar to those in the American Bill of
Rights, these principles rarely are applied in the traditional American
sense. '8 The author contends a primary cause for inadequate application of constitutional rights may be the lack of competent and veracious counsel, particularly in drug cases. 89 He suggests the United
States finance a public defender program to encourage Mexican civil
law attorneys to practice criminal law.' 90
Perhaps increasing the number of young Mexican criminal lawyers would improve the quality of legal services provided to American
prisoners and afford them greater due process protection. However, a
contrary result may occur if these attorneys continued the present
constitutionally inadequate practices. Increasing the number of attorneys does not necessarily increase the quality of legal services provided. Furthermore, the United States government's recent cutbacks
in domestic public fundings makes the development of such aid in
Mexico unlikely.' 9 '
Recognizing American constitutional imperfections, the lack of an
analogous precedent, and the lack of protection afforded United
States citizens abroad, one author advocates modifying the retention
provision. This provision allows foreign countries to assert exclusive
jurisdiction over the transferred prisoner. 92 She notes that the provi184. Vagts, supra note 18, at 329.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 328-29.
188. Id. Some of these similarities include: right to counsel, right against unreasonable
search and seizure and right to confrontation. However, in practice, the protections are severely
minimized. See Abramovsky & Eagle, supra note 18, at 314-15.
189. See Vagts, supra note 18, at 329.
190. Id.
191. Rauch, Zero Sum Budget Game, 19 NAT'L J. 1096, 1096 (1986) (noting that federal
aid to state and local governments has been severely cut in the past five years).
192. Note, Prisoner Transfer Treaties: Need for the Elimination or Modification of the
Retention Provision, 13 CAL.W. INT'L L.J. 321, 349 (1983). The "retention provision" is used to
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sion is dispensable because it varies in degree among the prisoner
transfer treaties. 19 She asserts similar future treaties should completely exclude the provision. 1 94 In this manner, the receiving state
retains jurisdiction as well as the right to unilaterally modify the sentence as it deems necessary. 195 Although this suggestion relieves
much of the tension between the treaty and the Constitution, it may
not be viable. Countries unable to negotiate a retention provision
may reject the entire transfer treaty.9' Thus, conditions would revert
to those prior to the Mexican Treaty's inception. If a treaty is to be
executed, the United States must bargain.

VIII.

RECOMMENDATIONS

All treaties are subject to constitutional prohibitions. 197 The prisoner transfer treaties, however, circumvent these constitutional restrictions because of insufficient due process safeguards. Respect for
human rights is a paramount concern, but the Constitution may not
be ignored. To alleviate the constitutional problem, scholars have
suggested alternatives giving the United States jurisdiction over
sentences imposed on Americans in foreign countries. However, foreign countries may view this as a threat to the integrity of their penal
systems and territorial sovereignty. Such suggestions may deter foreign countries from enforcing present transfer treaties or executing
future ones.
Although some commentators deem the agreements constitutional,'9 8 their reasoning is based primarily on extradition; a mere rationalization. As illustrated earlier, extradition is not analagous to
prison transfer. However, these authors rely on extradition cases' 99 to
justify the constitutionality of the prisoner transfer treaties. 0 0 The
Constitution, however, does not discuss extradition; thus, courts may
interpret it more freely. The Constitution specifically states one cannot be imprisoned in the United States absent due process of law.' 0 '
describe the condition asserting exclusive jurisdiction over the transferring state. See supra
note 19 for the provision's location in each prisoner transfer treaty.
193. Note, supra note 192, at 350.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 350-51.
196. See House Judiciary Hearings, supra note 22, at 126 (statement of Peter F.
Flaherty).
197. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
198. See House JudiciaryHearings, supra note 22, at 125-27 (statement of Peter F. Flaherty); id. at 133-34 (statement of Larry A. Hammond). See also Rosado, 621 F.2d at 1179.
199. E.g., Neely v. Henkel, 180 U.S. 109 (1901).
200. See House Judiciary Hearings, supra note 22, at 125 (statement of Peter F.
Flaherty).
201. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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Extradition, unlike transfer, is not imprisonment. Under prison
transfer, if the offender is transferred to a United States prison subsequent to a trial lacking adequate due process, his fifth amendment
rights are violated regardless of any justification or rationalization.
Strong policy concerns support prison transfer treaties. Without
such treaties, countless Americans incarcerated abroad would suffer
atrocities within foreign prison systems. The Constitution, however,
does not permit due process violations based merely on public policy
considerations. Proper waiver of due process can resolve the conflict.
One cannot voluntarily waive his due process rights, however, if his
only alternative to waiver includes torture and possible death.
Treaty supporters rely on spurious arguments to dodge the due
process issue. Strict adherence to the Constitution, however, compels
release of American transferees imprisoned in the United States subsequent to foreign convictions, absent acceptable due process safeguards. Thus, a country not granting Americans comparable due process rights probably would be unwilling to transfer prisoners because
of their potential release. These are the very prisoners the United
States wants to protect from substandard prison conditions. Strictly
interpreted, then,, the Constitution creates more suffering for American prisoners in foreign countries by preventing their transfer to the
United States. Supporters of the transfer treaties avoid the constitutional conflict by loosely construing the Constitution. They justify
the treaties' validity through a human rights policy.
A legitimate way to constitutionally enforce the transfer treaties
may be to amend their content. Unfortunately, this approach is impractical. As previously noted, foreign countries may not agree to negotiate or enforce existing treaties without a provision permitting the
transferring nation to retain jurisdiction over the sentence. 02 Strong
policy considerations exist for favoring prisoner transfer from substandard facilities. Altering the transfer treaty's content to meet
American constitutional standards may deter foreign nations from
entering into transfer treaties with the United States.
The only alternative is a constitutional amendment incorporating
compelling human rights standards. The amendment would nullify
certain constitutional rights when their enforcement conflicts with
human rights and public interests. Such an amendment would bring
the transfer treaties within constitutional bounds.
The proposed recommendation would resolve the conflict between
the treaties and the Constitution. Many commentators might agree
that prison transfer treaties are an unworthy reason to amend the
202. See House Judiciary Hearings, supra note 22, at 126 (statement of Peter F.
Flaherty).
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Constitution. An amendment, however, would constitutionally validate prison transfer treaties. Presently, transferees serve sentences in
the United States without constitutional safeguards. The proposed
amendment would provide transferees with adequate protection.
Proposed constitutional amendments, however, are rarely ratified.2 03 Over five thousand amendments have been submitted to Congress; only twenty-six survived.20 4 Constitutional change appears even
more unlikely when one considers eleven of the twenty-six amendments were passed essentially when the Constitution itself was ratified. 2 5 Three more took force directly after the Civil War.206 Thus,

fundamental constitutional revisions are improbable.2 7
In seriously considering this constitutional amendment, state legislatures must understand a dangerous precedent exists because of
the transfer treaties. A prisoner's waiver is not voluntary; therefore, a
due process issue emerges. If mere rationalization and policy concerns overcome one's due process rights, other constitutional guarantees may soon diminish through the same process.
English common law created due process to protect human rights.
However, transfer treaties have given rise to a situation in which due
process, if properly applied, would violate human rights. The proposed amendment would validate all due process waivers and protect
human rights within the confines of the Constitution. Because due
process originated to protect human rights, in cases of conflict human
rights should prevail.
203.

Article V of the Constitution provides for constitutional amendment.

The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, shall propose
Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the Application of the Legislatures of two
thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention for proposing Amendments which, in
either Case, shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes, as part of this Constitution, when
ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths of the several States, or by Conventions in
three fourths thereof, as the one or the other Mode of Ratification may be proposed by
the Congress ....
U.S. CONST. art. V. To qualify a proposed amendment for ratification, Congress may submit it
to the state legislature, which it has done all but once, or Congress may submit it to state
conventions. Van Alstyne, Notes on a Bicentennial Constitution:Part I, Processes of Change,
1984 U. ILL. L. REV. 933, 945 (1984). Ratification by state conventions involves the election of
delegate-candidates. Id. at 946. If Congress chooses the state legislative route, 38 states must
ratify the amendment. Id. at 945. A small minority of the least populous states can prevent
ratification if their opposing opinions are shared by just a few vehement committee leaders in
one house. Id. at 946. Even well supported proposed amendments such as the Equal Rights
Amendment (ERA) have failed. Id. at 945. The ERA came three states short of ratification. Id.
204. Van Alstyne, supra note 203, at 941.
205. Id. at 942.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 947.
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CONCLUSION

In executing the first prison transfer treaty with Mexico in 1977,
Congress took a significant step in aiding American prisoners incarcerated abroad. This treaty, however, was executed at the Constitution's expense. The United States Constitution is America's principal
governing instrument. Permitting subordinate instruments, such as
the prisoner exchange treaties, to subvert the Constitution's principles only weakens its authority and creates a precedent for similar
future conduct. Unconstitutional documents should be unenforceable; however, Americans should not have to suffer in foreign prisons.
Scholars have suggested ways of overcoming the constitutional
problems. These ideas are inadequate because of collateral considerations. Congress should seriously consider a constitutional amendment
sanctioning prisoner exchange treaties. Such an amendment would
constitutionally authorize actions favoring human rights when such
action otherwise would be unconstitutional.
In finding the prisoner transfer treaties valid, the United States in
its eagerness to protect human rights ignored the treaties' provisions
in conflict with the Constitution. The proposed amendment would
resolve this conflict by allowing the United States to constitutionally
recognize the prisoner transfer treaties. After all, the framers created
due process to protect human rights, not subvert them.
RONALD
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